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Abstract
Using income and other individual data from EU-SILC for Germany and Austria,
we analyze wage discrimination for three break-ups: gender, sector of employment,
and country of origin. Using the method of Machado and Mata [2005] the discrim-
ination over the whole range of the wage distribution is estimated. Significance of
results is checked via confidence interval estimates along the lines of Melly [2006].
To narrow down the extent of discrimination both basic decomposition possibilities
are compared. The economies of Germany and Austria appear structurally very
similar. Especially the institutional setting of the labor markets seem to be closely
comparable. One would, therefore, expect to find similar levels and structures of
wage discrimination. Our findings deviate from this conjecture significantly.
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1 Motivation
From a distance the economies of Germany and Austria appear structurally very
similar. Clearly, Austrias economy is highly dependent on trade with its big neigh-
bor, while no comparable reverse dependency exists. Especially the institutional
setting of the labor market seems to be closely comparable and therefore one would
expect to find levels and structures of wage discrimination in Austria similar to
those in Germany.
We will take a closer look at this issue by estimating the extent of wage dis-
crimination for three classical break-ups of the labor force: 1.) by gender, 2.) by
sector of employment and 3.) by country of origin. Using the EU-SILC data for
both countries, we are able to compare wage discrimination in Germany and Austria
straightforwardly. Additionally, we can use very similar models for comparing wage
discrimination within countries for the three break-ups.
Existing scholarly literature (see below) provides unanimous evidence for the ba-
sic direction of wage discrimination for each of these classifications. For levels and
explanations of wage discrimination, matters are less clear. Particularly, it must
be asked, to which extent observed wage differences arise from discriminatory re-
muneration of relevant characteristics (education, experience,. . . ) or from different
characteristics themselves. Such a decomposition of wage differences can be done
with different weighting schemes, depending on what reference group is chosen.
Contrary to most of the existing literature, we present both basic decompositions
to narrow down the extent of true wage discrimination.
In older papers such decompositions are calculated at the mean of the wage
distribution. Applying methods developed in the last decade we present wage dis-
crimination results not only at the mean, but over the whole range of the wage
distribution.
As far as we know analyzing discrimination between public and private employees
in Austria by such a decomposition is presented for the first time.
2 Literature
Wage discrimination by gender has been extensively studied in the past. For re-
cent international surveys see e.g. Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer [2005] and
Arulampalam et al. [2007].
For West Germany relevant results are found eg. in Fitzenberger and Wunder-
lich [2002] or Fitzenberger and Kunze [2005], but they do not lend themselves for an
easy comparison with the analysis here. Fitzenberger and Wunderlich [2002] focuses
on the dynamics of the gender pay gap between 1975 and 1995. Fitzenberger and
Kunze [2005], also use the approach of Machado and Mata [2005] (hereafter MM)
like we do. But they constrain their analysis to young workers with apprenticeships,
which clearly is a much more narrow research focus than ours. A comparable study,
instead, is the one of Heinze [2010]. She also uses the MM-approach but based
on matched employer–employee data for 2002. Decomposition of the total gender
pay gap in this study is into four parts according to (1) different individual charac-
teristics, (2) different remuneration of these individual characteristics, (3) different
establishment characteristics and (4) different remuneration of these establishment
characteristics. Starting from the observed total gender pay gap, which decreases
from 30% at the 1st decile to around 20% for the 8th decile she finds in particular
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that: a) contributions of these four components do not vary much across quantiles;
b) differences in the remuneration of establishment characteristics account for the
major part (22% – 16%) and c) differences in characteristics (individual and firm
specific) only explain a meager 4% of the overall difference. The EU-SILC data
base underlying the present analysis contains no such firm level data (beyond sector
and rough firm size) and does not allow distinction into West- and East-Germany.
Furthermore, Heinze also restricts attention to full-time employees. Therefore, our
results are not strictly comparable to hers. A conceptual problem with the 4-part
decomposition is the multitude of potential counterfactual densities that could be
used. Because only results for one particular choice are presented, the impact of
this specific choice upon results remains unclear. This issue will be discussed in
detail in section 3.3.
For Austria evidence on the gender gap is more sparse. In Bo¨heim et al. [2005],
Bo¨heim et al. [2007] quantile regressions are used but the decomposition is based
in traditional manner on conditional densities. As such, the corresponding results
strictly speaking are incorrect, because these decompositions of a total difference
always leave an unexplained residual of unknown size (see Garc´ıa et al. [2001] or
Fortin et al. [2011] for expositions of the problem). Nevertheless, the finding in
Bo¨heim et al. [2007] of a decline of pure wage discrimination of women from 17% to
14% between 1983 and 1997 is noteworthy for comparison. Pointner and Stiglbauer
[2010] also use the MM-approach, but their focus is on a decomposition along the
time axis comparing the Austrian wage distribution in 2002 with the one in 1996.
Only Bo¨heim et al. [2011] is somewhat more comparable to the present analysis.
It is based on Melly [2006], an approach comparable to Machado and Mata [2005]
and, thus, to the one used in the present paper. A distinguishing feature of Bo¨heim
et al. [2011] is the use of matched employer–employee data for over 13000 workers.
These, particularly, include (typically unavailable) firm-level data on work interrup-
tions due to unemployment spells or birth of a child. Concentrating on the private
sector, they estimate increasing wage discrimination against women across quantiles,
starting at 5% for the 1st decile and ending at 15% for the 9th with a rather con-
stant total difference of around 25%. They interpret the increasing discrimination
across quantiles “as evidence that women fare worse in individual bargaining than
men as most low paying jobs are covered by (industry-wide) collective bargaining
agreements.”
Also the decomposition of wage differences between public and private employees
into discrimination and explained parts has become a standard topic in scholarly
literature. See e.g. Poterba and Rueben [1995] for the US or Mueller [1998] for
Canada. For West Germany recent relevant evidence is found e.g. in Melly [2005b]
using data from the German socioeconomic panel (GSOEP). He also employs the
MM-approach but calculates the decomposition separately for men and women. For
men wage discrimination in favor of public employees is 5% at the 1st decile in 2001,
declining almost linearly to -17% at the 9th decile. For women the corresponding
estimates show a similarly linear decline, but from 30% down to 7%. Taking simple
averages of Melly [2005b] for comparison with our results, this amounts to a linear
decline in discrimination from around 17% at the 1st decile down to -12% at the
9th decile. It should be added, that Melly finds only negligible variation of this
decomposition results across the time period 1984 – 2001.
Evidence for such discrimination in Austria based on comparable approaches is
missing.
Wage differences between natives and immigrants is another typical area for
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the application of decomposition analysis, although less frequent for Germany or
completely missing as for Austria. A comparable study for Germany is Peters [2008],
who analyses the wage differences between native and immigrant fulltime employed
men in West Germany with the comparable approach of Melly [2006]. Based on
GSOEP data for 2006 he finds an increasing percentage of discrimination, starting
from zero at the lowest wages and reaching 12% for the top percentiles. Ivanov
[2008] instead starts from the selectivity (into certain sectors, types of contract. . . )
approach of Neuman and Oaxaca [2004a], extending it to quantile specific estimates.
But he focuses on women only. His major finding is the “predominant importance
of the endowment effect in explaining the wage gap”.
Comparable studies regarding wages of immigrants vs. natives for Austria to
the best of our knowledge are missing again. If anything, we find Austria covered
only as part of international comparative wage distribution studies, as the one by
Fournier and Koske [2012] for example. But none of these comes methodologically
near to the present approach.
3 Methodology
3.1 Decomposing wage differences
Observed wage differences between subgroups can be considered as sum of explicable
differences and pure discrimination, both unobserved. Thus, the key issue is to
quantify the contribution of various explanatory wage-relevant characteristics to
this sum. Only the part not explicable by different characteristics of the subgroups
can be regarded as (pure) discrimination.1 To estimate the two components requires
an “as if” calculation: What, for example, would the wage distribution of women
look like, if they received the same remuneration for each characteristic as men? One
might also pose the same question differently: What would the wage distribution of
men look like, if they had equal schooling and experience etc. (i.e. characteristics)
as women? The phrasing does not matter. The important thing to note is, that, in
econometrics terms, this requires the estimation of counterfactual distributions.
In the classical approach by Oaxaca [1973] and Blinder [1973] (OB) the de-
composition principle is most easily illustrated, because it involves only expected
values and does not require counterfactual distributions. In the first step of the OB-
decomposition one would explain individual wages wi by individual characteristics
Xi (=covariates including a constant) via some regression approach, separately for
both subgroups:
Wik = βˆkXik + ik for k = 1, 2
where βˆk denotes the estimated vector of remuneration coefficients for group k.
Based on these estimates the mean raw wage difference conditional upon group
specific mean values of covariates Xk can be defined as
W 1 −W 2 = βˆ1X1 − βˆ2X2
1In the econometric literature dealing with decomposition this discriminatory part is called structural
effect, whereas the part associated with different characteristics is known as composition effect. We will
keep using the terms “discrimination” and “explained differences” instead.
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The desired decomposition is then derived by a simple manipulation of this equation:
W 1 −W 2 = βˆ1
(
X1 −X2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained
+
(
βˆ1 − βˆ2
)
X2︸ ︷︷ ︸
discrimination
(1)
A different question one might ask is: What would the wage distribution of men
look like, if they received remuneration for each characteristic like women? This
would imply the use of a different counterfactual and would lead to the following,
complementary decomposition:
W 1 −W 2 = βˆ2
(
X1 −X2
)
+
(
βˆ1 − βˆ2
)
X1 (2)
The question of choosing between (1) or (2) will be treated in section 3.3. Here it
should be merely stressed, that both of these decompositions cover only mean wage
differences. But, as is well established, mean effects of covariates in wage equations
are often not representative for all quantiles of the wage distribution.2 Therefore,
a natural route to improved decompositions is to use the quantile regressions from
Koenker and Bassett Jr. [1978] to explain wages rather than the simple model for
averages as above. This entails a drawback, however, because now the conditioning
of expected wage differences upon mean values of covariates is no longer appropriate.
3.2 The Machado/Mata-approach
Machado and Mata [2005] (hereafter MM) provide one possible solution to this
problem. They augment conditional quantile estimates for the coefficients βk with
corresponding unconditional densities (actual and counterfactual) derived from re-
sampling.3 The MM-approach is widely used and more intuitive than alternative
decomposition approaches.4 and can be summarized as follows:
Let nk observations on wagesWk and individual characteristicsXk for two groups
k = 1, 2 be given. Assume linearity of conditional quantiles, i.e. that wages are
drawn independently from a distribution F−1W |X(τ |xi) = xiβ(τ) for all τ ∈ (0, 1)
(Koenker and Bassett Jr. [1978]). Thus, quantile regression coefficients β(τ) can be
interpreted as remuneration of the different characteristics at the specified quantile
of the conditional distribution. Choose a sufficiently large number S of bootstrap
samples to be drawn.5
1. Draw a random sample {τ˜s}Ss=1 of quantiles from the uniform (0,1)-distribution
and random samples X˜1 = {X˜1s}Ss=1 and X˜2 = {X˜2s}Ss=1 with replacement
from X1 and X2, respectively.
2A more thorough discussion of the shortcomings of the OB-decomposition is found e.g. in Fortin
et al. [2011].
3Similar ideas are found in Gosling et al. [2000], Albrecht et al. [2003] and Melly [2005a]. Testing with
these approaches only yielded marginally different results relative to those of MM and are not reported
here.
4Decomposition alternatives without quantile regressions include the reweighting technique of DiNardo
et al. [1996], or RIF-regressions with reweighting by Fortin et al. [2011].
5We found that the number of bootstrap samples S required to get stable results should be a multiple
of the total number of observations. For the application we have chosen S = 40000 which is roughly
four times the n1 + n2 number of observations in the case of Germany and eight times in the case of
Austria. With this number of bootstraps the differences between the MM approach and Melly [2005b]
are negligible for practical purposes.
5
2. For s = 1 . . . S do:
(a) Estimate6 regression coefficients βˆ1(τ˜s) for quantile τ˜s conditional on X1
and a vector βˆ2(τ˜s) conditional on X2.
(b) Define wages w˜1s = X˜1sβˆ1(τ˜s) and w˜2s = X˜2sβˆ2(τ˜s) associated with these
coefficients for quantile τ˜s.
(c) Construct counterfactual group 1 wages w˜c1s = X˜1sβˆ2(τ˜s) based on re-
muneration of characteristics like for group 2, and, analogously w˜c2s =
X˜2sβˆ1(τ˜s).
The above calculations yield four different bootstrap samples: The first two of
them, W˜1 ≡ {w˜1s}Ss=1 and W˜2 ≡ {w˜2s}Ss=1, mimic the unconditional wage distribu-
tions for the two groups.7 The second two, W˜ c1 ≡ {w˜c1s}Ss=1 and W˜ c2 ≡ {w˜c2s}Ss=1,
are the counterfactual wage distributions required for decompositions (3) and (4)
below.8
3.3 Dependency of results upon choice of counterfac-
tual
Analogous to the two basic weighting schemes in the OB-approach, the MM decom-
position can be based on two alternative, basic counterfactual distributions.9 W˜ c2
defined above, for example, stems from the question, what the wage distribution
of women (group 2) would look like, if the remuneration of their characteristics
were like that for men (group 1). So the counterpart to the OB-decomposition (1),
evaluated at some quantile of interest θ would be:
W˜1θ − W˜2θ = W˜1θ − W˜ c2θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained
+ W˜ c2θ − W˜2θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
discrimination
(3)
In (3) the part explained by different characteristics is evaluated at group 1 payments
while the discriminatory part (remuneration differences) is evaluated at group 2
characteristics. The alternative, complementary decomposition, would then be
W˜1θ − W˜2θ = W˜ c1θ − W˜2θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained
+ W˜1θ − W˜ c1θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
discrimination
(4)
which is the counterpart to OB-decomposition (2). In (4) the part explained by
different characteristics is evaluated at group 2 payments while the discriminatory
part is evaluated at group 1 characteristics.
6 Formulated as a programming problem, quantile regression coefficients β(τ) for quantile τ are esti-
mated as solution to minβ(τ) (1/n)
∑
i ρτ [w− xiβ(τ)] with ρτ (u) = τu for u ≥ 0 and ρτ (u) = (τ−1)u for
u < 0. We use the R-package quantreg by Roger Koenker for that purpose (see Koenker [2012]).
7 Step 3 (b), by the probability integral transformation principle, simulates random sampling from
the (estimated) conditional distributions of wki conditional on Xk, for k = 1, 2. Or, put differently: The
wki consistently estimate the corresponding quantiles of the conditional distribution, see Koenker (1978).
Repeating these quantile estimates for S random draws of characteristics from the original distributions
then amounts to integrating out these characteristics from the corresponding conditional distributions.
8 For more details see Machado and Mata [2005]. A formal proof of consistency and asymptotic
normality of the derived difference measures is contained in Albrecht et al. [2009].
9Numerous non-basic counterfactual distributions can be imagined and found in the literature (see
Cahuc and Zylberberg [2004] pp. 280–282 for a short discussion). For example, one based on fictitious
non-discriminatory market remuneration coefficients βm for both groups. Such non-basic counterfactuals
are not considered here.
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It should be stressed, that there is no natural choice between the two decompo-
sitions, unlike some of the applied literature implicitly suggests by reporting results
for only one of them. As Fortin et al. [2011] put it: “There will be no wright
answer” to the question of choosing a meaningful counterfactual. In a medical ex-
periment, instead, it might make sense to consider the control group (let’s say group
2), which received no medication, as natural reference group. In such a controlled
setup one would single out decomposition (4) as the relevant one: It captures the
item of primary interest, the average treatment effect upon the treated (group 1)
as W˜1θ − W˜ c1θ. In this context the use of W˜1θ as weighting scheme to calculate the
average treatment effect (β1 − β2) arises naturally. The composition effect, as the
remaining term W˜ c1θ − W˜2θ in (4) would here be called, could be made arbitrarily
small by deliberately choosing individuals with similar characteristics for both the
treatment and the control group. This would render the proper choice for weight-
ing the differences in characteristics irrelevant. Furthermore, the application of the
treatment to the whole population would not affect prior estimates of the treatment
effect, if both groups were chosen representatively in the prior medical experiment.
Unfortunately, such reasoning does not translate to the realm of economics. Here
it is quite unclear, what, for example, the abolition of gender wage discrimination
(the “treatment”) means: In a general equilibrium setup the outcome might be
a new wage structure leaning more towards the former wages of men or of those
of women. Without formulating a general equilibrium model we simply cannot
tell. The upshot of this is that we will refrain from steering results in one or the
other direction by a corresponding choice. Instead, we will simply report results for
both decompositions. Only if these results are more or less the same, will we draw
stronger conclusions about discrimination.
3.4 Asymptotic variance of differences
We will present the decomposition results along with confidence intervals based on
Melly [2006], who derives asymptotic standard errors for the relevant differences
analytically and proves their consistency. 10 Furthermore, he shows the numerical
identity of his own approach and the one in MM, when the number of bootstrap
samples drawn in the latter goes to infinity. Consequently, the asymptotic standard
errors of Melly [2006] also apply to the MM-calculations. Analytical standard errors,
of course, require less computation time than the alternative bootstrapped variant
thereof. An additional advantage, as shown in Melly [2006], is that they usually
outperform bootstrapped standard errors in finite samples in terms of MSE. For
an alternative derivation of analytical standard errors in the MM-framework see
Albrecht et al. [2009].
3.5 Selectivity and sample selection bias
A question applying to any such decomposition analysis is whether the distribution
of wage-relevant characteristics (limited/unlimited or fulltime/parttime contracts,
management positions. . . ) does not already capture part of the discrimination.
In the literature this issue is discussed under the heading of “selectivity” (see e.g.
Neuman and Oaxaca [2004b]). If, for example, immmigrants were less likely to
10Melly provides a corresponding R-source code on
http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Blaise Melly/code R rqdeco3.html
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find jobs in the public sector than comparatively qualified natives, this could be
considered as part of discrimination. But in the analysis below, the wage effects of
such practices would be subsumed under “explained differences”.
A related issue is sample selection bias. It could occur, for example, if low
qualified women are more likely to refrain from offering their labor services on the
market (and thus would not be part of the sample) than comparably qualified men.
In this case the observed wage differences between women and men are likely to
understate the true extent of discrimination. Evidence confirming this conjecture
can be found for example in Albrecht et al. [2009] and Picchio and Mussida [2010].
But, like selectivity, this issue is outside the scope of the present paper.11 Therefore,
our discrimination estimates should be regarded as conservative. Regarding the
gender comparison between the two countries sample selection is no issue because
female participation rates are about the same in Germany (25.1%) and in Austria
(24.4%). Likewise the extent of parttime work is comparable (22.6% in Germany
vs. 19.4% in Austria).
4 Data description
Our estimates are based on EU-SILC cross-section data for 2008 in revision 3 from
March 2011. These data contain a rich variety of economically relevant information
about individuals on an internationally comparable basis. For Germany these data
cover originally roughly 24000 persons, from which, after filtering about 10000 valid
observations remained. For Austria the corresponding numbers are 11000 and 4700,
respectively. See Tables 1 – 5 in the appendix for more details on filtering and
resulting group sizes.
Key filter criteria for a valid observation are employee status as well as employ-
ment and positive gross labor income during the last year.12 Additional filter criteria
are valid responses on some variables. For Germany the relative size of the relevant
subgroups in the overall sample are 46% women, 28% public sector employees and
10% of foreign origin. The corresponding figures for Austria are 44% women, 24%
public sector employees and 17% of foreign origin. In Austria additional 47 observa-
tions were skipped due to recorded experience (EXP) values of zero, despite values
of 1 (indicating valid response) of the corresponding flag variable.
Hourly wages are constructed by dividing gross wages (PY010G) for the reference
year by total hours worked. The latter are calculated from months worked fulltime
(PL070) plus parttime (PL072) times 4 (weeks per month) times hours worked per
week in the main job (PL060) plus in other jobs (PL100).
All estimates are corrected for the different individual weights (PL040) in the
EU-SILC data set. The extent of oversampling or undersampling in the various
subgroups of the original dataset can be determined from these weights and is
reported in the above mentioned tables in columns labeled “%os”.
11Relevant approaches are found e.g. in Buchinsky [1998], Albrecht et al. [2004], Neuman and Oaxaca
[2004a] or Ivanov [2008].
12This latter criterion may potentially introduce another type of sample selection bias, as it ignores
different likelihoods of longer unemployment spells for each subgroup considered. See section 3.5.
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4.1 Regression specification
The choice of explanatory variables is primarily guided by availability in the EU-
SILC data set and includes the traditional variables in Mincerian wage equations
plus a few, which in later studies have shown to be significant wage drivers. Our
dependent variable in all calculations is the logarithm of wages per hour.
Turning to the explanatory variables: To proxy years of schooling (not covered
by EU-SILC data) highest education level attained (PE040) is used. Thereby, lower
secondary education and below is coded as EDU2 (and used as reference category),
at least upper secondary but no university degree as EDU3 and tertiary education
as EDU4.13 Based on prior specification tests we decided to deploy age (AGE) in
linear form, but work experience in years since first job in linear (EXP) and in
squared form (EXP2).14
Holding a management position (MGR) is captured with an extra dummy, if
occupation is of type “Legislators, senior officials and managers” (i.e. PL050=11,
12 or 13). Furthermore, firm size is captured via a dummy (BIG), taking value 1
for work in a unit with at least 50 employees. Like in comparable studies, where
they repeatedly have proven to affect wages significantly negative, also consensual
union status (living alone as opposed to cohabitation = SINGLE) and TEMPJOB
(for labor contracts of limited duration as opposed to unlimited ones) are covered
by corresponding dummies.
The sector in which someone is employed is classified as either AIC, SERV or
PUB based on an aggregate version of the corresponding classification in EU-SILC
(variable PL110), the “Statistical Classification Of Economic Activities” according
to NACE revision 1.1. Occupation in a service oriented sector (but excluding public
administration) is coded as SERV=1 when PL110 is in ("g","i","j","k","o+p+q").
Occupation in manufacturing, construction and other non-service oriented sector is
coded as AIC=1 when PL110 is in ("a+b","c+d+e","f"). And finally employment
in the public sector is coded as PUB=1 when PL110 code is in ("l","m","n"). The
latter group, apart from explicit public administration jobs ("l") also includes jobs
in the education ("m") and the health sector ("n"), because the vast majority of
jobs in these sectors is publicly financed in Germany and Austria. We have chosen
AIC as reference sector. Thus, coefficients of PUB and SERV indicate wage gains
relative to sector AIC. Additional variables include dummies for males (MALE) and
for being born abroad (IMM).
To estimate group-specific densities (underlying the decompositions) the single
dummy variable identifying affiliation with one or the other group in any comparison
(i.e. MALE or PUB or IMM) is skipped. Management positions (MGR) had to
be skipped in comparing natives vs. immigrants, because the latter rarely hold
such positions (see the numbers given in Table 2 and 4), leading to failures of the
resampling procedure when it came to the calculation of boundary quantiles. Thus,
the three regression specifications underlying the three comparisons are:
13Unfortunately, the understanding of these education levels has been different in Germany and Austria.
This explains the implausible, massive differences in the proportions of these three levels between the
two countries (see Tables 2 and 4 in the Appendix). This prohibits comparing the estimated standard
quantile regression coefficients for these variables between countries. To our knowledge, statistical offices
are aware of the corresponding shortcomings and currently work on improved definitions and comparable
coding.
14 Using “age”, “age2” and “experience” instead of “age”, “experience” and “experience2” lead to a
worse fit and was formally rejected by corresponding tests.
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1. Comparison men vs. women:
log(WAGE/HOUR) ← IMM, PUB, SERV, EDU3, EDU4, EXP, EXP2, AGE,
MGR, BIG, SINGLE, TEMPJOB
2. Comparison public vs. private sector employees:
log(WAGE/HOUR)←MALE, IMM, SERV, EDU3, EDU4, EXP, EXP2, AGE,
MGR, BIG, SINGLE, TEMPJOB
3. Comparison natives vs. immigrants:
log(WAGE/HOUR)←MALE, PUB, SERV, EDU3, EDU4, EXP, EXP2, AGE,
BIG, SINGLE, TEMPJOB
5 Results from standard quantile regressions
Standard quantile regression results are stated here only briefly for reference. The
public sector dummy coefficient in the case of Germany serves as striking exam-
ple for the potential benefit of quantile regressions over OLS (see Figure 1). The
OLS coefficient (the solid, horizontal line) indicates about a 4% wage advantage of
public sector employees. The quantile regression coefficients (the dash-dotted line),
instead, show, that public sector employment for individuals in the lowest 10 per-
centiles means an advantage of roughly 6%, while for the individuals in the top 10
percentiles it implies a disadvantage of around 15% with an almost linear decline
in between. Austrian public sector employees (see Figure 9), instead, earn almost
consistently more (between 0 and 6%) than their private sector counterparts, but
without any unique tendency either downward or upward across quantiles. Further-
more, in case of Austria the OLS results do not differ significantly from the quantile
regression results.
Figure 1: Public sector employment coefficient, Germany
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Dash dotted line = quantile regression estimate with 5% and 95% confidence bounds
(the gray band, based on bootstrapping). Horizontal lines = OLS-estimate along with
same confidence bounds.
Regarding experience, it can be calculated from the coefficients displayed in fig-
ures 8 and 9 (jointly considering the linear and the squared experience term), that
the contribution of additional experience to wages vanishes practically completely
for the highest income brackets. Furthermore, the impact of experience upon wages
comes in U-form: Ceteris paribus the highest expected wages are achieved at a
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medium experience level, while they are lower with either very low or high experi-
ence. With respect to education, we find advantages of education levels 3 and 4+
compared to reference level 2 which are significantly higher for the bottom than for
the top percentiles. This constrasts sharply with the results in Machado and Mata
[2005], who state that “education has a greater effect upon the wages of individuals
at the top of the wage distribution than upon wages of individuals at the bottom of
that distribution”. Age, on the other hand, has a steadily increasing quantitative
impact upon wages if we move up across quantiles. Starting at or below zero for
the bottom percentile the corresponding coefficient reaches values between 0.01 and
0.02 for the top percentiles.15 The latter, evaluated at an age of 40, implies an age
premium between 1.5 and 4.4% per year.
Turning to the coefficients of the other two grouping variables used in the de-
composition analysis below we find the following: First wages of German men are
roughly 10 – 15% higher than those of women with a falling tendency towards higher
quantiles. The comparable figures for Austria are not only higher overall (in the
15 – 20% range) but also tend to increase towards the top quantiles. For both
countries we find that these estimates typically do not differ significantly from the
corresponding OLS figures. Second, for persons born abroad (∼ immigrants) wages
are consistently lower than for their domestically born colleagues in both countries.
In Germany the disadvantage hovers about −3% beyond the 10th percentile, only
below it is absolutely higher (but not significantly so). In Austria the disadvantage
of immigrants is more than −20% in the bottom percentiles, then, up to the 70th
percentile remaining persistently below −11% and vanishing only towards the top
few percentiles. Again, in both countries these results do not deviate significantly
from their OLS counterparts.
6 Decomposition results
At the core of the present analysis is the decomposition of wage differences for
each quantile based on unconditional densities, both basic and counterfactual. The
corresponding results are graphically depicted in Figures 3 – 6. Some of them are
remarkably distinct from corresponding OB-decomposition results given in tables 6
– 8. Apart from decomposition, they also draw quite different pictures of overall
wage differences between subgroups than the standard quantile regressions.
Each graph in Figures 3 – 6 shows total wage differences16 at regularly spaced
quantiles (0.05, 0.10, . . . 0.95). In each case the left graph is based on decomposition
(3) and the right graph on decomposition (4). Results are visualized by three lines:
a) the total difference (solid line), b) the difference explicable by characteristics
(long-dashed line) and c) the purely discriminatory part due to payment differences
(short-dashed line). By construction, the latter two must sum to the total.
The differences apply to log wages and, therefore, are proxies for percentage
differences in the wage levels (“log-point percentages”). As indicated above, all
comparisons are done by calculating group 1 wages minus group 2 wages. There-
fore, group 2 wages (women, private sector employees or natives) are the basis of
percentage figures.
15 This is a fairly standard result and easy to interpret: Negative values for the bottom percentiles
arise naturally, if the lowest incomes are associated with manual labor, which deteriorates in quality with
age. Positive values for higher incomes simply reflect widespread seniority pay.
16Synonymously we will speak of overall wage differences or raw discrimination.
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6.1 Men vs Women
The main results regarding wage differences by gender in Germany are depicted in
Figure 2. As can be seen, the overall differences beyond the 2nd decile are roughly
constant around 23%. Only towards the lower percentiles they fall and reach an
overall low of 10% in the bottom percentile. These figures are considerably lower
than those of Heinze [2010], but it is unclear to which degree this comes from our
inclusion of parttime employees (∼ 22.6% in the sample). To reconcile the findings
one would have to assume, that the raw wage difference amongst parttime employees
(concentrated in the lower income brackets) is considerably lower than for fulltime
employees. However, roughly a third of our estimated differences (or 8 percentage
points) can be attributed to different characteristics of women and men (in Heinze it
is only around a sixth). This leaves a pure discrimination of around 15% (compared
to the 20% found by Heinze).
Figure 2: Percentage wage differences between men and women in Germany
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Left: decomposition (3). Right: decomposition (4). Solid line = total difference. Long-dashed line = wage dif-
ferences explained by different individual characteristics. Short-dashed line = wage discrimination due to different
payment of same characteristics. Data source: EU-SILC 2008, revision 3 (March 2011).
The picture for Austria (see Figure 3) is rather different and striking, because
nearly all wage differences are due to pure discrimination against women at a rather
stable margin of 20% across all income groups. Consequently, wage differentials
explicable by different characteristics are nowhere significantly different from zero,
indicating no such differences in characteristics. Comparing the left and the right
corresponding graphs also makes clear: This result does not depend on the weighting
scheme used for the decomposition. Whether using variant (3) or variant (4), the
picture remains the same. This contrasts strongly with results from Bo¨heim et al.
[2011], where the explained part is significantly different from zero, leaving only
between 5% and 15% of pure discrimination. The restriction of Bo¨heim et al. [2011]
to private sector employees can not explain this difference, because inclusion of
public sector employees should, if anything, decrease estimated wage discrimination
of women.
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Figure 3: Percentage wage differences between men and women in Austria
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See legend in Figure 2.
6.2 Public vs. private sector
For Germany the very pronounced falling tendency and sign reversal of wage differ-
ences between public and private sector across quantiles has already been indicated
by the simple quantile regressions above. Figure 4 sheds more light on this find-
ing: Obviously, differences in qualification do not exhibit this falling tendency at
all. Rather, the characteristics of public sector employees have persistently higher
earning potential compared to those of their private sector colleagues, and would
justify roughly 8–10% higher wages. By the same token, the true discrimination is
roughly 10 percentage points lower than the observed total wage differentials. So it
is the remuneration factor (the discriminatory part), which accounts for this falling
tendency in the overall difference. Thus, the situation of German public sector
employees can be described as significantly advantageous (at most 12% at the 2nd
decile) for incomes below the 60th percentile and as significantly disadvantageous
above (reaching −20% for the top percentiles).
Figure 4: Percentage wage differences between public and private employees in Germany
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See legend in Figure 2.
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The relevant Austrian case is displayed in Figure 5. It shows a more or less
constant earnings advantage of public sector employees of slightly above 20% up
to the 4th decile. Then the advantage declines steadily to around 8% for the 95
percentile. But, unlike in Germany, the differences in characteristics of public sector
employees vs. their private sector colleagues follow this overall wage discrimination
pattern more or less closely. Put differently, differences in characteristics can explain
at least around three quarters of the overall wage difference. This leaves a purely
discriminatory income advantage of public sector employees of between 0% and 5%,
depending on quantile and decomposition type.
Figure 5: Percentage wage differences between public and private employees in Austria
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See legend in Figure 2.
6.3 Immigrants vs. natives
The last comparison is between immigrants (more exactly, those being born in a
foreign country) and natives. The standard OB-decomposition in Table 8 indicates,
that we should expect an overall earnings disadvantage of immigrants relative to
natives of around 12% in Germany and 21% in Austria. Furthermore, it suggests,
that pure discrimination accounts for only a very little fraction of overall differences
in Germany and for a highly variable proportion in Austria, depending on quan-
tile. Results from the MM-approach applied to Germany are depicted in Figure
6. As can be seen, overall wage differentials between immigrants and natives are
almost continuously declining in absolute value, starting at around -18% in the 10th
percentile and monotonically approaching zero towards the top end. Despite some
discrepancies between the two possible weighting schemes, the MM-decomposition
reveals differences in characteristics as major explanatory factors of this finding. In
the lower half of the wage distribution these differences in characteristics account for
between 60% and 90% of the observed differences, leaving a pure discrimination be-
tween 0 and 5%. In the top half of the distribution the decomposition depends more
on perspective, but there discrimination is far less of an issue anyway with pure dis-
crimination nowhere exceeding -6%. These findings are roughly in line with Ivanov
[2008], although he focuses on women only. This suggests, that discrimination of
immigrants is not a matter of gender. Contrastingly, in Peters [2008] an increasing
discrimination of immigrants across quantiles is reported, reaching a maximum of
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around −12% for the top percentiles, where we find, instead, discrimination to be
negligible. Given our results and those of Ivanov, it is hardly possible, that the
restriction of analysis to male workers in Peters can account for this difference. It
is also questionable, whether Peter’s further restriction to West German full time
employees can explain this divergence.
Figure 6: Percentage wage differences between natives and immigrants in Germany
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See legend in Figure 2.
The case of Austria is very different again (see Figure 7). There immigrants earn
between 15% and 25% less than their native colleagues.17 These differences follow
a marked U-shape reaching a maximum discrimination at around the 8th decile.
This implies markedly stronger wage discrimination against foreign professionals
than against foreign blue collar. Higher earning potential of the characteristics of
natives can account only for 5 to 10 percentage points of the overall difference in
variant (3), whereas it displays high variability when using variant (4). Only for
the top 2 deciles we get a unanimous picture of pure discrimination as significantly
dominating explanation for observed wage differences.
17 Fournier and Koske [2012] report a difference of 25% at the median (Figure 13) where we find 20%.
One reason for this difference might be that we classify all persons born abroad as immigrants, while
Fournier and Koske count only those born outside the EU. Furthermore, their underlying regression
specification is not quite clear. The basic data set instead is the very same as used here.
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Figure 7: Percentage wage differences between natives and immigrants in Austria
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7 Summary
This paper analyses wage differences between subgroups of the population in Ger-
many and Austria: Men vs. women, public employees vs. private employees and
natives vs. immigrants. The amount explicable by different characteristics and the
amount due to pure discrimination is determined using the approach of Machado
and Mata [2005]. Estimation is based on the EU-SILC data base for 2008 with
roughly 10000 useful observations in Germany and 5000 in Austria. The results
are augmented with confidence intervals from Melly [2006]. These together with
a comparison of the two basic decomposition possiblities allow to draw some firm
conclusions:
Gender — For Germany we find persistent overall wage differences of 20% –
25% for men and women. 15 percentage points thereof come in the form of pure
discrimination against women above the second dezil. From there towards the lowest
percentiles discrimination vanishes monotonically. Different characteristics, on the
other hand, can explain only between 5 – 10 percentage points. This explained
part is somewhat higher than that reported in Heinze [2010] for 2002, indicating, if
anything, an increase of the gender pay gap. For Austria a rather constant overall
advantage of male wages of around 20% above the second dezil is estimated with
a similar decline towards the bottom end as in Germany. But unlike in Germany,
these differences can not be explained at all by different characteristics of men and
women. Instead, it appears exclusively as a matter of discrimination. This result is
very different from Bo¨heim et al. [2011].
Employment sector — The public/private sector overall wage gap in Ger-
many follows a very particular pattern: While at the bottom end of the income
distribution public sector employees enjoy an advantage of 25% this turns almost
linearly into a 15% disadvantage at the top end. The pure discrimination part of this
exhibits the very same pattern 10 percentage points below. Thus, roughly speak-
ing, pure discrimination turns from 15% to −25%. These results are comparable to
Melly [2005b] based on 2001 data. Corresponding results for Austria, instead, point
towards a persistently positive overall wage advantage of public sector employees,
from 20% at the bottom down to 10% at the top of the wage distribution. Regard-
ing pure discrimination matters are less clear with figures ranging between 0% and
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10%, depending on the decomposition used. The latter highlights the importance
of reporting results for both decompositions. In both countries the explained part
of overall differences is significantly positive for all quantiles.
Country of origin — Overall wage differences between immigrants and na-
tives in Germany follow a rather regular upward pattern, starting from −20% at
the bottom and reaching practically zero at the top. But pure discrimination against
immigrants accounts for only 0 – 5 percentage points thereof and appears not to
be statistically significant at usual confidence levels. By the same token, thus, the
largest part of observed overall differences can be attributed to different charac-
teristics of natives and immigrants. Overall figures for Austria, instead, follow a
pronounced U-shape accross quantiles reaching an absolute maximum of −25% at
around the 7th decile with roughly −15% at both ends of the wage distribution. The
pattern of pure discrimination looks much alike and reaches −20% at around the
8th decile. For wages above the third decile this pure discrimination is statistically
significant and can be interpreted as effective deterrence of potential immigrant
professionals.
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Appendix
Data filtering
Table 1: Filtering of observations
Germany Austria
Total Observations before filtering 24336 10955
Employees 12656 8614
Grossincome > 0 12363 5856
Typical weekly hours in main job > 0 12633 5944
Months worked (full- plus parttime) > 0 12422 6304
Firmsize known or <= 10 24336 10954
Response occupation (ISCO-88) 22376 9844
Response industry (NACE 1.1) 12595 5691
Response firmsize 12526 5334
Response experience 22143 9844
Remaining Observations after filtering 10280 4661
Data source: EU-SILC, cross-section 2008, revision 3, March 2011
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Final data for Germany 2008 (after filtering)
Table 2: Group size and hourly gross wages across subgroups in Germany
n %os %WOM %IMM %PUB mean median
ALL 10280 51.4 95.0 33.0 16.8 15.6
MEN 5282 -5.5 0.0 5.0 22.3 18.9 17.5
IMMIGR 514 -49.0 48.8 100.0 24.5 16.1 13.9
EDU2 806 -43.1 52.9 10.7 21.5 9.6 7.3
EDU3 4540 -14.3 49.2 3.8 24.6 14.4 13.7
EDU4 4934 38.4 47.4 5.2 34.6 20.2 18.8
SINGLE 2895 -15.3 55.9 3.6 34.4 14.1 13.2
TEMPJOB 798 -10.3 58.8 7.8 34.6 12.0 10.0
MGR 521 16.6 26.5 3.8 17.1 25.0 21.9
BIG 5968 1.9 41.1 5.2 35.3 19.0 17.7
SERV 4123 -7.5 51.6 5.2 0.0 16.0 14.1
PUBL 3390 19.8 65.3 3.7 100.0 16.9 16.3
Legend: n = number of observations in original sample. %os = percentage oversampling in original
sample relative to correct figure. Data source: EU-SILC, cross-section 2008, revision 3, March 2011
Table 3: Group size and hourly gross wages across sectors in Germany
n %os %WOM %IMM mean median
AGRIC 130 -7.8 23.5 7.5 10.4 9.4
MANUF 2158 -5.5 24.1 10.8 19.2 17.9
CONSTR 479 -15.8 13.5 12.6 13.8 13.2
TRADE 1413 -9.1 52.7 8.3 13.8 12.3
GASTRO 176 -28.7 64.5 31.4 9.4 7.3
TRANSP 591 -11.9 29.1 11.6 17.0 15.0
FINAN 540 -0.4 50.5 4.4 22.6 20.9
ESTATE 796 -4.1 52.9 14.7 17.1 14.5
OSERV 607 -0.8 58.9 11.6 14.8 13.9
PUBADM 1297 13.5 45.8 3.3 17.8 17.1
EDUC 796 49.3 66.1 7.3 19.1 18.1
HEALTH 1297 12.4 78.9 8.8 14.5 13.9
Legend: n = number of observations in original sample. %os = percentage oversampling in original
sample relative to correct figure. Data source: EU-SILC, cross-section 2008, revision 3, March 2011
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Final data for Austria 2008 (after filtering)
Table 4: Group size and hourly gross wages across subgroups in Austria
n %os %WOM %IMM %PUB mean median
ALL 4661 54.6 85.6 25.5 16.7 14.3
MEN 2545 -2.5 0.0 15.4 17.1 18.0 15.7
IMMIGR 672 -16.9 41.7 100.0 16.1 13.9 11.8
EDU2 606 -10.9 51.2 29.5 14.7 9.5 9.3
EDU3 2561 0.7 42.3 11.9 19.4 15.3 13.7
EDU4 1494 4.0 48.4 12.5 35.1 21.9 18.7
SINGLE 1610 -8.7 48.1 10.6 23.5 14.4 12.8
TEMPJOB 225 -10.2 55.1 19.1 35.1 14.6 12.2
MGR 224 8.7 19.6 8.0 21.4 27.2 21.1
BIG 1868 0.4 36.3 14.3 27.3 18.1 16.0
SERV 2084 -0.3 51.3 15.6 0.0 16.2 13.3
PUB 1188 4.6 63.4 9.1 100.0 18.3 16.2
Legend: n = number of observations in original sample. %os = percentage oversampling in original
sample relative to correct figure. Data source: EU-SILC, cross-section 2008, revision 3, March 2011
Table 5: Group size and hourly gross wages across sectors in Austria
n %os %WOM %IMM mean median
AGRIC 42 -12.5 41.9 20.0 10.5 10.3
MANUF 955 -0.6 23.6 18.0 16.5 14.6
CONSTR 392 -8.2 11.0 28.4 15.2 13.9
TRADE 785 0.6 52.3 15.2 15.9 12.3
GASTRO 229 -11.2 63.1 40.0 11.9 9.8
TRANSP 289 0.0 31.1 13.9 15.8 14.8
FINAN 188 10.6 45.3 3.6 21.9 20.4
ESTATE 415 2.2 52.5 19.6 17.9 14.9
OSERV 178 -4.3 53.4 20.3 14.2 12.7
PUBADM 401 3.4 41.4 3.7 18.5 16.7
EDUC 342 4.3 68.9 11.6 21.2 18.4
HEALTH 445 6.0 76.3 16.1 15.8 14.6
Legend: n = number of observations in original sample. %os = percentage oversampling in original
sample relative to correct figure. Data source: EU-SILC, cross-section 2008, revision 3, March 2011
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Standard Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions
Table 6: Log wage differences between men and women
variant ∆total ∆char ∆pay
Germany (1) 0.207 0.058 0.149
(2) 0.207 0.067 0.140
Austria (1) 0.183 0.022 0.161
(2) 0.183 -0.005 0.188
∆total = total difference; ∆char = difference due to different characteristics; ∆pay =
difference due to different remuneration of same characteristics;
Table 7: Log wage differences between public and private sector
variant ∆total ∆char ∆pay
Germany (1) 0.079 0.093 -0.015
(2) 0.079 0.094 -0.016
Austria (1) 0.167 0.166 0.001
(2) 0.167 0.111 0.056
See legend in Table 6
Table 8: Log wage differences between natives and immigrants
variant ∆total ∆char ∆pay
Germany (1) -0.116 -0.103 -0.014
(2) -0.116 -0.091 -0.026
Austria (1) -0.211 -0.067 -0.143
(2) -0.211 -0.121 -0.090
See legend in Table 6
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Standard quantile regression results
Figure 8: Estimation of log hourly wages, pooled sample, Germany 2008.
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Figure 9: Estimation of log hourly wages, pooled sample, Austria 2008.
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Dash dotted line = quantile regression estimate with 5% and 95% confidence bounds (the gray band, based on
bootstrapping). Horizontal lines = OLS-estimate along with same confidence bounds.
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